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The courts have, for some seventy-odd years, sought to har-
monize the conflicting policies of collective bargaining and com-
petition. But the conflict is so irreconcilable that, apart from
entirely subordinating one to the other, the regulatory distinctions
employed must be largely arbitrary-there ar no general prin-
ciples by which these policies can be harmonized. And since the
courts generally must rely on principle in the exercise of the
judicial function, their record is not a happy one.'
I.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the supposed conflict be-
tween the antitrust laws and the labor laws 2 is the diction employed to
describe the forms of conduct regulated under each. What constitutes
unlawful conduct by businessmen is sketched somewhat hazily ;3 but un-
lawful conduct by unions is depicted with intricate-and sometimes
exasperating--detail. 4 Nothing has been added to the slender catalogue
of proscribed business practices contained in the Sherman Act in the
seventy-six years since its passage ;5 but Congress seems forever to be
tinkering with the itemization of union unfair labor practices in section
8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act 6 and with the descriptions of
* B.A., Cornell University, 1953; M.A., Columbia University, 1954; LL.B., Yale
University, 1957. Member of the New York bar and of the firm of Rubenstein
& Rubenstein.
'Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L. J. 14, 16-17 (1963).
2 By "antitrust laws" is meant the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964), and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 38
Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1964) and 29
U.S.C. §§52-53 (1964). By "labor laws" is meant the National Labor Relations
Act (the Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), and its successor, the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), as amended, 61 Stat. 136(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§141-188 (1964).
3 The substantive evils with which the Sherman Act is concerned are depicted
in §§1 and 2 (15 U.S.C. §§1 and 2). Declared illegal by §1 is "every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce. . . ." Section 2 makes it a misdemeanor to "monopolize;
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations .. "
4 See §8(b) of the Taft-Hartley version of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §158(b) (1964).
5 Two provisos added to §1 in 1937 validate a contract to prescribe minimum
resale prices for a product which bears "the trademark, brand, or name of
the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open
competition with commodities of the same general class produced or dis-
tributed by others...."6 The original National Labor Relations Act proscribed only certain employer
practices. The Taft-Harley Act amended the National Labor Relations Act,
inter alia, to define and proscribe under §8(b) certain union unfair labor
MANDATORY BARGAINING
conduct outlawed under other provisions of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947.
7
If we may assume that the draftsmen of legislation know what they
are doing," the conclusion follows that Congress had good reason for the
use of sweeping generalities in the definition of unlawful business con-
duct and equally good reason for the precision with which unlawful
union conduct is described. The omission from the Sherman Act of
readily applied norms of conduct or of meaningful definitions of the
nature of the proscribed activities, particularly in the context of the
procedural aspects of that statute,9 impels the conclusion that what was
practices. Section 8(b) was amended in a variety of respects by the Landrum-
Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 525 (1959), which also added a new union-employer un-
fair labor practice under §8(e). See text accompanying notes 59-61.
Section 302, 29 U.S.C. §186 (1964), prohibits the making of certain kinds
of payments to union representatives but declares lawful, upon compliance
with the section's provisions, the checking off of union dues and the pay-
ment of welfare and pension fund contributions; §303, 29 U.S.C. §187 (1964),
confers a private right of action upon "whoever shall be injured" by second-
ary conduct declared an unfair labor practice by §8(b) (4); and §304, 18
U.S.C. §610 (1964), makes permanent the temporary war-time prohibition(former 50 App. U.S.C. §1509) against unions' contributing to the campaign
funds of candidates for national office. Sections 302 and 303 were both
amended by the Landrum-Griffin Act.
s Consider §4 of the U.S. Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. §4
(1964). Under that statute, any issue as to the "making of the arbitration
agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform" it may be tried
before a jury. The draftsman of the statute had testified that there is a
constitutional right to a jury trial of such an issue, Hearings Before Joint
Judiciary Committee (68th Cong., 1st Session, 1923-1924) 17. In so doing,
he failed to consider the historical distinction between law and equity, and
has been criticized on that score by a variety of commentators. See, e.g., 5
Mooaa's FEDEPAL PRAcTIcE (2d ed. 1951) 129.
9 The Sherman Act, in its original form, provided only for suits by the federal
government "to prevent and restrain" violations of the substantive mandates
of the statute. See 26 Stat. 209, §4 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §4 (1964).
A host of new procedural remedies was made available by the Clayton
Act and subsequent legislation. Section 4 of Clayton (38 Stat. 731 [1914], 15
U.S.C. §15 [1964]) authorizes private treble-damage suits; §4A (69 Stat.
282 [1955], 15 U.S.C. §15a [1964]) authorizes suits for actual damages by
the federal government; §5 (38 Stat. 731 [1914], as amended, 15 U.S.C. §16[1964], makes a final judgment or decree in favor of the federal government
prima facie evidence in "any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant," or in an action by the federal government under
§4A, "as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto"; §15 (38 Stat. 736 [1914], as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §25 [1964]), like §4 of the Sherman Act, authorizes in-junction suits brought by the federal government; and §16 (38 Stat. 737 [1914],
15 U.S.C. §26 [19641) confers upon private litigants the right to sue for
injunctions against either Sherman or Clayton Act violations.
In addition to establishing new procedures, the Clayton Act added several
new proscriptions. Section 2 (38 Stat. 730 [1914], as amended, 15 U.S.C. §13
[1964]) makes it unlawful to discriminate among customers with respect to
prices, services, or facilities; §3 (38 Stat. 731 [1914], 15 U.S.C. §14 [1964])
declares unlawful agreements of lease or sale under which the lessee or
purchaser is prohibited from using or dealing in "the goods, wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller"; §6 (38 Stat. 731 [1914], 15 U.S.C. §17[1964]), by declaring that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce," insulates ordinary union activity from liability under
§§2 and 3; §7 (38 Stat. 731 [1914], as amended, 15 U.S.C. §18 [1964]) pro-
hibits the acquisition of the stock of one corporation by another, if "the
1966]
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contemplated was the adumbration, by the federal judiciary, of a "com-
mon law" of business regulation. (In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills0
the Supreme Court held that §301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 19471" is a mandate to the judiciary to elaborate a new federal
common law of the collective bargaining agreement; 12 but there has
never been, to the author's knowledge,'3 a similar pronouncement with
respect to the function of the judiciary in enforcing the policies ex-
pressed in the antitrust laws.) The reasons for this are obvious: any
attempt by Congress to enumerate exhaustively the forms of business
combination sought to be made illegal would doubtless prove an exercise
in futility because of the talent of lawyers and businessmen for invent-
ing new types of structures to avoid statutory proscriptions; and, more
importantly, there is no basis for saying that all combinations in restraint
of trade are necessarily harmful to society and therefore worthy of de-
struction. In certain forms of business-public utilities, common car-
riers radio wave communications systems-completely "open" compe-
titio4 is either undesirable or impossible. In still other industries, an
economist's determination must be made as to how much restraint of
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly"; and §8 (38 Stat. 732 [1914], as amended, 15
U.S.C. §19 [1964]) prohibits interlocking of directorates and officers among
banks subject to federal regulation.
Since it is obvious that no labor organization-acting as such, rather than
as entrepreneur in some hypothetical business-can be found guilty of a
Clayton Act violation, the present discussion of antitrust regulation is con-
cerned only with the substantive prohibitions of the Sherman Act, enforce-
ment of which is now available under the variety of procedures scattered
throughout both statutes.
10 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1161 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §185 (1964).
'
2 Said Mr. Justice Douglas:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under §301 (a)
is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our na-
tional labor laws. . . . The Labor Management Relations Act expressly
furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may
not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of
express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but
will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning
a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventive-
ness will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . .Federal inter-
pretation of the federal law will govern, not state law .... But state law,
if compatible with the purpose of §301, may be resorted to in order to find
the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy .... Any state law ap-
plied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an inde-
pendent source of private rights.
353 U.S. 448, 456-457 (1957).
13 It may be that the Supreme Court has somewhere characterized the anti-
trust laws in a manner similar to its statement about §301, but if so, the
writer is not aware of any such utterance. Any "common law" of antitrust
would be so clogged with economic assumptions and so affected by the views,
at a given time, of what is necessary or permissible governmental or judicial
interference with the dealings among themselves of businessmen that the
precedential value of decisions would of necessity be slight, when compared
with the precedential value of decisions construing and enforcing a special
class of contractual obligations like the collective bargaining agreement.
[Vol. 50
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trade is socially acceptable; and it is from this determination, oddly,
that the conclusion of legality or illegality is made to flow."a
Although the Sherman Act speaks of "every" contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade, it is beyond question that the gen-
eral prohibition has never been taken seriously. What is outlawed are
those combinations which the Justice Department and the courts, at a
given time, find detrimental to society in general. A significant quirk of
the antitrust laws is the extent--the whole area of private litigation-to
which responsibility for the development of national economic policy
is left to dialogue between private litigants and the judiciary.
Although, to be sure, certain doctrinal approaches have emerged and
deveolped in the years since the passage of the Sherman Act, the impres-
sion one often gets is that the result in an antitrust case is more likely
to be affected by the court's views of the economic pattern underlying a
particular cause of action than by those economic facts which are actu-
ally recited as the basis for judicial determination. In the litigation
which brought about the divesture by DuPont and Christiana Securities
of their enormous holdings of General Motors stock, Mr. Justice
Brennan speaks of the evil as being the possibility that DuPont and
Christiana might exercise their voting power so as to compel General
Motors, willy-nilly, to purchase only DuPont paint.1 4 If this issue -were
really what troubled the Department of Justice and the Supreme Court,
the problem coud readily have been disposed of by an apropriate injunc-
tive order.1 5 The required divestiture one would suppose, was designed
to remedy a far different and certainly more important problem: the
concentration of the combined economic powers of DuPont and Gen-
eral Motors in the hands of a very small group of persons.
The decisional history of the antitrust laws shows, over the years, a
significant broadening of the scope of conduct regulated (or sought to
be regulated) thereunder. Combinations which at one time may have
been perfectly unobjectionable have subsequently been held violative of
the Sherman Act, in part because of the courts' expanding views of
their duties and powers, in part because of altered economic situations.
Similarly, the acceptance or rejection of certain assumptions about prac-
tical economics doubtless plays a significant role-how significant one
can only guess-in determining how a given sort of business conduct
will, at a given time, be treated under the antitrust laws.
A familiar businessman's complaint is that he can never predict with
13a See, e.g., Singer, The Concept of Relative Concentration in Antitrust Law,
52 A.B.A.J. 246 (1966).
14 United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
15 Four years after the Court rendered its first decision (United States v. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra note 14) it reversed the district court's
order pursuant to which the defendants were to be enjoined from voting
their General Motors stock, and ordered complete divestiture. United States
v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
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confidence whether a projected corporate merger or a new marketing
policy will bring down upon his head the calamity of an adverse holding
in antitrust litigation. Although businessmen in general bemoan the
administration of the antitrust laws for this reason, it may very well be
that this seemingly "unprincipled" 16 approach to the public regulation
of business holds within it one of the conditions precedent for the flour-
ishing of a dynamic business society.
Unlike statutes which closely regulate certain forms of business be-
cause by the very nature of those businesses chaos would reign in the ab-
sence of such regulation, the antitrust laws allow to the general business
community almost limitless possibility of choice in the establishing and
implementing of procedures. They are subject only to the caveat that
the particular conduct engaged in at a given time may, for reasons con-
sonant with what is deemed to be public policy at that time, be held
illegal. The regulatory scheme is designed not to promote competition
in some abstract sense of the word, but to promote meaningful competi-
tion. Some restraints of trade, therefore, will not be held violative of
the antitrust laws, while others will. Underlying the antitrust laws is
the assumption that businessmen, for their own good and for the good
of the nation's economy, should be encouraged to exercise their in-
genuity to the greatest possible extent short of performing actions
which will either destroy actual competition in the pricing and market-
ing of products or which will effectively keep other businessmen from
entering into or surviving in a given type of economic activity. The
equally unhappy alternatives to the regulatory scheme posited by the
antitrust laws are a planned economy or the sort of close regulation
that is only, one would hope, permissible in those industries which by
their very nature require regulation for survival.
II.
It is a familiar of history that the early days of Sherman Act litiga-
tion were marked by anti-union judges who wantonly and repressively
employed the injunctive remedy to frustrate the legitimate aims of or-
ganized labor ;17 but what is forgotten, in one's haste to condemn the
judges of the past, is that the notion of such a thing as "organized
labor" was to them wholly novel and doubtless incomprehensible. Of
course an individual was guaranteed the right to quit his employment-
in effect, to strike-in an effort to induce his employer to pay him
16 Winter, supra note 1 uses the term "unprincipled" to refer to decisions that
cannot be explained by the ordinary application of stare decisis or by the
extension of holdings in prior litigation. He seems to believe that only when
dealing with union activity does the courts' decisional approach to the anti-
trust laws betray this quality. It is the assumption of this paper, however,
that decisions in the field of antitrust are equally susceptible of being con-
sidered "unprincipled" whether concerned solely with businessmen or with
unions, acting alone or in conjunction with businessmen.
17 See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION (1930).
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higher wages, but a considerable leap of the imagination was required
to go from the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary
servitude to the conclusion that a number of individuals could lawfully
do concertedly what each of their number might properly do by him-
self. Although the earliest cases speak of concerted activity' s in terms
of the law of "conspiracy" (whatever that is), it was not very long be-
fore jurists and legislators began to wonder whether there might not
indeed be some forms of concerted union activity which were not in-
herently illegal. By 1914, when it passed the Clayton Anti-Trust Act,
Congress had developed some notion of what forms of union conduct
are lawful; section 2019 specifically prohibits the issuance of injunctions
against a variety of forms of "lawful" union conduct, "lawfully" per-
formed.
Organized labor, with characteristic inattention to grammatical de-
tail, greeted the Clayton Act as an "Industrial Magna Charta."2 0 But the
Supreme Court in Duplex v. Deering2' was quick to seize upon the fish-
hook in the Clayton Act and to hold that secondary activity, earlier held
violative of the Sherman Act,22 was not exempted from the taint of ille-
gality by the newer statute because such conduct does not fall within the
"normal and legitimate objects" of labor unions.22a
Duplex v. Deering, a widely condemned and ultimately scrapped2 3
decision, was perhaps the last major attempt by the Supreme Court to
define, under the antitrust laws, the ambit of permissible union conduct
solely in terms of the nature (objectively viewed) of the activity in-
volved. In the two Coronado Coal cases, 24 decided shortly thereafter,
the Court, in ruling that violent activity by the union against the em-
ployer was not of itself actionable under the Sherman Act, hit upon the
test of legality of motivation. The idea was that a merely "local motive"
to shut down one mine is not illegal, but that when the shutdown was for
the purpose of stopping the production of non-union coal so as to pre-
vent its shipment in interstate commerce, "where it would by competition
tend to reduce the price of the commodity and affect injuriously the
maintenance of wages for union labor in competing mines,"'25 the other-
I8 The term "concerted activity" is here used in the same sense as in the
National Labor Relations Act. To speak of "union activity" or of "labor
organizations" would be unduly restrictive in considering some of the early
cases.
1938 Stat. 738 (1914) 29 U.S.C. §52 (1964). For the full text of the section,
see note 86, infra.
29The misnomer is Samuel Gompers', quoted in Wrrrz, THE- GovREmmET IN
LABOR DISPUTES 68 (1932).2 1 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
22Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
22a Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
23 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
24UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Coronado Coal Co. v.
UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
25 Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, supra note 24 at 310.
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wise innocuous act of violence is transmuted, solely by virtue of this
question of intention, into a violation of the Sherman Act.
In the two decades that followed Duplex v. Deering, the popular
climate was more favorable towards unionism than it had been in the
early days of the Sherman Act.26 The Norris-LaGuardia Act2 7 and the
original National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) were among
the legislative responses to the quite patent fact that something had
gone wrong at the end of the 'twenties. But the labor laws, unlike most
of the alphabet soup that the federal government brewed in the 'thirties,
did not propose to regulate the enterprise that they sought to promote.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act curbed the power of the federal judiciary
to issue injunctions in "labor disputes"; and the Wagner Act, in addition
to guaranteeing to employees the right to organize themselves into unions
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of bettering their
lot, spelled out four specific unfair labor practices which employers were
forbidden to perform, as well as a catch-all one which made it illegal
for them to restrain employees in the exercise of their guaranteed
rights.28 To the draftsmen of these statutes, it was apparently unthink-
able that any union conduct might contravene public policy.
In 1941 the Supreme Court came close to a declaration that unions
are exempt from prosecution under the antitrust laws. The issue, as
described by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his majority opinion in United
States v. Hutcheson,29 was:
Whether the use of conventional, peaceful activities by a
union in controversy with a rival union over certain jobs is a vio-
lation of the Sherman Law.30
The carpenters' union, of which Hutcheson was president,3 ' struck a
brewery for the purpose of compelling it to assign certain work to its
members, rather than to members of the machinists' union, with which
the brewery also had a collective bargaining relationship. In furtherance
of their aims, the carpenters instituted a consumer boycott against the
employer's beer and also struck a lessee of the brewery for the apparent
purpose of inducing it to compel the brewery to come to terms. As Mr.
Justice Roberts and Mr. Chief Justice Hughes correctly observed in
26 No attempt is here made to review exhaustively, or even adequately, the
antitrust litigation that preceded the two cases-Pennington and Jewel Tea-
which occasioned this article. For an incisive summary of the dismal history
of the judiciary's attempt to regulate union conduct under the antitrust laws,
see Winter, supra note 1.
2747 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §101 (1964).
28 See 49 Stat. 449 (1935), §8.
29 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
so Id. at 227.
32A fascinating account of Hutcheson's suzerainty of the United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America is given in CRmIsTIE, EMEIx IN WOOD(1955). See also Christie v. Raddock, 169 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
[Vol. 50
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their dissenting opinion, such secondary activity had traditionally been
thought-since Loewe v. Lawlor,32 at least-to be prohibited by the
Sherman Act.
In affirming the dismissal of the indictment, a bare majority"3 of
the Supreme Court read the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
into the Sherman and Clayton Acts and wiped out, in a stroke, substan-
tially all earlier doctrine on the question. After asserting that "an indict-
ment may validly satisfy the statute under which the pleader proceeded,
but other statutes not referred to by him may draw the sting of crim-
inality from the allegations," 34 Mr. justice Frankfurter went on to say:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the fetters upon trade
union activities, which according to judicial construction §20 of
the Clayton Act had left untouched, by still further narrowing
the circumstances under which the federal courts could grant in-
junctions in labor disputes. More especially, the Act explicitly
formulated the 'public policy of the United States' in regard to
the industrial conflict, and by its light established that the allow-
able area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been
in the Duplex Printing Press Co. case, to an immediate em-
ployer-employee relation. Therefore, whether trade union conduct
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined
only by reading the Sherman Law and §20 of the Clayton Act
and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of out-
lawry of union conduct. 35
Were then the acts charged against the defendants pro-
hibited or permitted by these three interlacing statutes? If the
facts laid in the indictment come within the conduct enumerated
in §20 of the Clayton Act they do not constitute a crime within
the general terms of the Sherman Law because of the explicit
command of that section that such conduct shall not be 'con-
sidered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.'
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
32208 U.S. 274 (1908).
33 Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the decision; Mr. Justice Stone con-
curred in the result, but disagreed with the majority's reasoning; and the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts dissented.34 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229 (1941).
35 The dissenters found this reasoning less than satisfactory:
By a process of construction never, as I think, heretofore indulged
by this court, it is now found that, because Congress forbade the issuing
of injunctions to restrain certain conduct, it intended to repeal the pro-
visions of the Sherman Act authorizing actions at law and criminal prose-
cutions for the commission of torts and crimes defined by the anti- trust
laws. The doctrine now announced seems to be that an indication of a
change in policy in an Act as respects one specific item in a general field
of the law, covered by an earlier Act, justifies this court in spelling out an
implied repeal of the whole of the earlier statute as applied to conduct of
the sort here involved. I venture to say that no court has ever undertaken
so radically to legislate where Congress has refused so to do.
Id. at 245.
It is of course a familiar proposition that certain conduct may not proper-
ly be enjoined, even though its commission may serve the basis for an action
to recover tort damages or a criminal indictment. See, e.g., Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under §20 are not to
be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or un-
wisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfish-
ness of the end of which the particular union activities are the
means.36 There is nothing remotely within the terms of §20 that
differentiates between trade union conduct directed against an
employer because of a controversy arising in the relation between
employer and employee, as such, and conduct similarly directed
but ultimately due to an internecine struggle between two unions
seeking the favor of the same employer.3 7
Mr. justice Stone, in a concurring opinion,38 points up the extent to
which the Court in Hutcheson granted labor unions amnesty under the
antitrust laws. In his view, there was no need to construe the antitrust
laws with the Norris-LaGuardia Act because the dispute was essentially
a "local" matter-a direct hassle between an employer and a labor or-
ganization which, under the doctrine of the Coronado Coal cases39 and
Apex Hosiery v. Leader,40 was not subject to the regulatory ambit of
the antitrust laws. 41 But the Court's majority went far beyond and, in
36 In Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945), decided the same day as Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), discussed below, at text
accompanying footnotes 43 through 54, the Court held, five to four, that no
violation of the Sherman Act resulted from the union's refusal to admit the
plaintiff-petitioner's employees to membership, the refusal having been paft
of a personal vendetta against him and for the calculated purpose of driving
him out of business. Mr. Justice Frankfurter silently joined in the dissenting
opinion.
3 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1941). (Emphasis added.)
3sId. at 237.
39 Note 24 supra.
40310 U.S. 469 (1940).
41 The scope of federal authority under the antitrust laws and under the labor
laws is coextensive with the constitutional "commerce power," United States
v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). It had formerly been thought that a wholly
intrastate taxicab business which did not constitute a link of "commerce" by
virtue of its monopolizing the means of transportation between the termini
of interstate carriers was exempt from prosecution under the antitrust laws
upon the theory that such business could not constitutionally be regulated by
Congress, United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). Today, how-
ever, the conduct of labor relations in such businesses is presumably subject
to regulation by the NLRB, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S.
1 (1957).
In Terminal System, Inc., 22 S.L.R.B. 387 (1959) the employer contended
that the New York Board lacked jurisdiction of an unfair practice charge
filed by the UAW upon the theory that the Guss decision brought the enter-
prise under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, even though under thejurisdictional standards that obtained at the time of filing, the NLRB
would have declined to assert its jurisdictional power. The union argued
that the Yellow Cab case was authority for the proposition that the em-
ployer's business fell outside the scope of the commerce power, and that the
State Board might properly assert jurisdiction. In dismissing the complaint,
the Board agreed with the employer that the case fell within the exclusivejurisdiction of the NLRB.
The moral simply is that notions of the ambit of the commerce power
have altered remarkably over the years. The Stone view of the power of
the judiciary to regulate union conduct under the antitrust laws should
properly, the writer suggests, be considered as expressive primarily of an
understanding of the scope of the constitutional commerce power that is at
[Vol. 50
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the italicized passage quoted above, made it clear that no union conduct
was to be held subject to the antitrust laws unless it be found that the
union acted in conjunction with "non-labor groups." 42
Allen-Bradey v. Local 3, IBEW43 presents a classic instance of what
the majority in Hutcheson felt properly subject to antitrust regulation
and of the difficulties inherent in their view.
Local 3 of the IBEW had agreed with various New York City man-
ufacturers of electrical equipment upon wages and other normal terms
of collective bargaining agreements. It also had collective bargaining
agreements with substantially all the electrical contractors in the city.
There was a tripartite agreement pursuant to which the contractors
agreed to purchase equipment only from those manufacturers that had
collective bargaining agreements with Local 3; the union instructed its
members not to work on other equipment; and the prices to be paid for
various kinds of equipment were to be determined by an industry board.
The manufacturers were enabled to sell their products to the contractors
at enormous profits (far higher prices were charged than the prices at
which the same manufacturers sold the same products to buyers outside
New York City); the contractors, because of the standardization of
their service rates, had no difficulty in passing the inflated cost of these
products on to the consumers; and the union for its part exacted un-
usually favorable wages and other conditions of employment. It was a
charming arrangement, i.e., everyone profited but the general public
and those manufacturers of electrical equipment whose employees were
not represented by Local 3.44
marked variance with the present thinking on the subject. This analysis would
render the Court's holding in Apex v. Leader and the Stone opinion in the
Hutcheson case as obsolete as the Court's treatment of the taxicab industry in
the Yellow Cab case.
The present analysis differs from the usual view that the Apex case was
concerned with the substantive legitimacy of certain forms of union conduct
rather than with the jurisdictional power, under the commerce clause, to
regulate such conduct. The general counsel of the Industrial Union Depart-
ment of the AFL-CIO has written recently of "the universally accepted as-
sumption that, since Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader ... any union action in
which 'the immediate concession demanded from an employer' is a wage
agreement is exempt from the antitrust laws." Feller and Anker, Analysis
of Import of Supreme Court's Antitrust Holdings, 59 L.R.R.M. 103, 105
(1965). Variant readings of Apex are to be expected. See, for example,
Winter, supra note 1, at 39-45. "Through an unsuccessful mixture of precedent
and 'considered' dicta . . . [Mr. Justice Stone] attempted to describe to the
bar and subordinate bench what kinds of union activity would violate the
Sherman Act in the future. And in the process of elaborating the standard,
he abandoned it." Winter, supra note 1 at 39.
42To the extent that a labor union engages in the conduct of an ordinary busi-
ness its activities are, of course, as properly subject to antitrust regulation
as are those of other entrepreneurs. See, e.g., Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea
Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1958).
43325 U.S. 797 (1945).
44The "out-group" included manufacturers wh'ose employees were represented
by other international unions and even manufacturers whose employees were
represented by other locals of the IBEW.
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The Allen-Bradley Company, a manufacturer situated outside New
York City, brought suit under the Sherman Act for an injunction pro-
hibiting the continuance of this arrangement. 45 The district court con-
firmed4 6 the special master's finding in favor of the plaintiff ;47 and an
appeal was taken to the Second Circuit.
In reversing,48 Judge Clark noted that the Department of Justice
apparently believed that no violation of the antitrust laws was presented
by the factual pattern alleged in the complaint,4 9 because in a similar
context, the Supreme Court had refused to allow a Sherman Act con-
viction predicated upon coercive activity taken by another union that
sought terms not unlike those embodied in Local 3's agreements. 50
Speaking for Judge A. N. Hand and himself, Judge Clark reasoned that
if Local 3 might not properly be charged with antitrust violation if it
had struck to compel the manufacturers and contractors to agree to an
arrangement like the one at bar, it would be absurd to hold that the fact
of agreement necessarily altered the picture. Thus:
If a dispute as to the conditions of work between a union and
employers still remains a labor dispute as to third persons inter-
ested therein or injured thereby, its complexion is hardly changed
by a settlement-possibly only an armistice, not a treaty-between
the original parties which hurts the third persons more than did
the original controversy.
51
The Supreme Court reversed.5 2 Speaking for the majority, Mr. Jus-
tice Black defined the issue in these terms:
Quite obviously, this combination of businessmen has vio-
lated both §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, unless its conduct is
immunized by the participation of the union. For it intended to
and did restrain trade in and monopolize the supply of electrical
equipment in the New York City area to the exclusion of equip-
ment manufactured in and shipped from other states, and did
also control its price and discriminate between its would be cus-
tomers .... Our problem in this case is therefore a very narrow
one-do labor unions violate the Sherman Act when, in order to
further their own interests as wage earners, they aid and abet
business men to do the precise things which that Act prohibits 75
Having thus stated the problem in terms of the narrow exception to the
general rule of union nonliability formulated in the Hutcheson case, it
45 Subsequently, Allen-Bradley filed a treble damage suit, the litigation of which
was held in abeyance pending disposition of the injunction suit. Allen-Bradley
Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 145 F. 2d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1944).
46 Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 51 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
47Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 41 F Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
48 Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 145 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir. 1944).
49Id. at 217 n. 1.
5G United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 318 U.S. 741 (1943).
51 Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 145 F. 2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1944).52 Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
53 Id. at 800-801.
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was quite easy for the Supreme Court to proceed t a holding that the
acts described in Allen-Bradley did constitute a violation by Local 3 of
the Sherman Act. In so doing, the Court was careful not to expand the
Hutcheson exception:
Our holding means that the same labor union activities may
or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon
whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups. This, it is argued, brings about a wholly undesirable re-
sult-one which leaves labor unions free to engage in conduct
which restrains trade. But the desirability of such an exemption
of labor unions is a question for the determination of Congress.5"
III.
Allen-Bradley was decided in 1945. The era of unabashed federal
promotion of trade unionism was coming to an end; but the Court's
view of legitimate union conduct was practically indistinguishable from
the thinking that underlay the Wagner Act. Although-like most Su-
preme Court decisions-Allen-Bradley has been cited for a variety of
propositions, its holding does not extend by an inch the narrow ambit of
antitrust regulation of labor unions defined in the Hutcheson case. The
conspiracy among Local 3 and the New York City electrical manu-
facturers and contractors was so clearly reprehensible that if it could
not be enjoined under the antitrust laws, doubtless some other form of
regulation would have had to be invented. It is a law school bromide that
hard cases make bad law; but in Allen-Bradley the Court had before it
a ready solution, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's celebrated dictum in the
Hutcheson case. It was enough to apply that dictum to a set of facts that
conveniently fitted its mold.
In the twenty years that followed Allen-Bradley the Supreme Court
did little of interest in the field of the antitrust regulation of labor
unions.5 5 In this period the public attitude towards labor unions and the
541d. at 810.
55 The two most significant exceptions to this blithe pronouncement are United
States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) and Local 24,
IBT v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). Both of these cases deal less with the
question of substantive legality or illegality than with the question of thejurisdictional power of the forum to enforce a particular regulatory scheme
under which certain conduct might be held illegal.
The Employing Plasterers case presented a factual pattern almost identical
with that in Allen-Bradley. The one distinction was that the combination was
solely between a union and an association of employers in the plastering in-
dustry; there was apparently no attempt to regulate the purchase in Chicago
of plastering equipment or supplies similar to the agreement in Allen-Bradley
that regulated- the contractors' purchase of electrical equipment. The district
court, thinking that the combination was essentially local and therefore beyond
the reach of the antitrust laws, dismissed the government's complaint in a
civil antitrust suit. In reversing, the Supreme Court's majority said:
We are not impressed by the argument that the Sherman Act could
not possibly apply here because the interstate buying, selling and move-
ment of plastering materials had ended before the local restraints be-
came effective. Where interstate commerce ends and local commerce
begins is not always easy to decide and is not decisive in Sherman Act
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propriety of their regulation by the federal government had undergone
a sea-change. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,56 the Wel-
fare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958,"7 the Landrum-Griffin
Act of 1959,58 and a variety of other legislative enactments document
the shift of the government's approach to the problem of labor relations.
By virtue of 1947 and 1959 amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, the Allen-Bradley situation would now present a union unfair
labor practice under section 8(b) (4) (B) 59 and a union-employer unfair
labor practice under section 8(e) . 60 (Ironically, a proviso to §8(e),
which makes the execution of Allen-Bradley agreements an unfair labor
practice, specifically validates such agreements so far as the construction
industry is concerned.) 61 Under the National Labor Relations Act in its
present form, temporary injunctive relief could be granted,6 2 upon the
Board's application, after the issuance by its general counsel of a com-
plaint founded upon a charge alleging the commission of acts identical
with those involved in the Allen-Bradley litigation. In addition, the party
cases . . . However this may be, the complaint alleged that continu-
ously since 1938 a local group of people were to a large extent able to
dictate who could and who could not buy plastering materials that had
to reach Illinois through interstate trade if they reached there at all.
Under such circumstances it goes too far to say that the Government
could not possibly produce enough evidence to show that these local
restraints caused unreasonable burdens on the free and uninterrupted
flow of plastering materials into Illinois. That wholly local business re-
straints can produce the effects condemned by the Sherman Act is no
longer open to question.
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, supra at 189. As pointed out
in Mr. Justice Minton's dissenting opinion, the holding clearly flouted the
Apex Hosiery rule concerning "local" occurrences presumably not subject
to federal regulation.
IBT v. Oliver showed the opposite side of the coin. There the Supreme
Court reversed an injunction that had been issued under the Ohio antitrust
law, finding that the assertedly illegal provision of the collective bargaining
agreement attacked by the plaintiff covered a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining and was therefore not to be subjected to the taint of illegality
under state law. Fudged were the questions whether the contractual pro-
vision at bar might properly have been held violative of the federal antitrust
laws and whether the mere fact that a contractual provision concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining is absolute insulation from viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. All that the case really holds, therefore, is that
collective agreements which regulate the rental paid to owner-drivers of
trucks by interstate motor carriers fall within the regulatory power granted
to Congess by the commerce clause of the Constitution.
5661 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141 (1964).
5r 72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C. §§301-309 (1964).
58 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
59 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (B) (1964).
6029 U.S.C. §158(e) (1964).
81 The first proviso to §8(e) exempts from the prohibitions of the subsection "an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done
at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building,
structure, or other work .. " The second and third provisos treat the gar-
ment industry even more kindly, exempting them not only from unfair
practice liability under §8(e) but under §8(b) (4) (B) as well, and adding
that "nothing in" the National Labor Relations Act "shall prohibit the en-
forcement of any collective] agreement" in the industry.
62 See §10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(j) (1964).
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injured by the commission of an unfair labor practice defined in section
8(b) (4) has been given a new federal cause of action, independent of
NLRB procedures, for actual damages and "the cost of the suit" 63 in-
cluding, perhaps, attorney's fees.64
If the Frankfurter dictum in the Hutcheson case and the Supreme
Court's holding in Allen-Bradley are to be taken seriously as limiting the
possibility of union violation of the antitrust laws to situations where
unions combine with "non-labor groups," it would seem that the entire
realm of union conduct presently thought to be violative of the antitrust
laws is now regulated under the labor laws. It is proper, therefore, to
ask whether such conduct should still be held subject to the antitrust
laws, or whether it should be exclusively regulated under the statutory
scheme which covers it in explicit detail.
So to phrase the question, one should think, would be to call for only
one answer. In 1965 the Supreme Court, like Horace's mountain, labored
over this problem. Its solution, to say the least, is puzzling.
IV.
A sampling of the commentary on the Pennington65 and Jewel Tea 6
cases is indicative of the abstruseness they have created. A champion of
new curbs upon unions' power complains:
The Pennington case has ... added a major amendment to the
Allen-Bradley doctrine, namely, unions may legitimately con-
spire with management to eliminate competition when they do so
in conjunction with public officials.67
Equally troubled union spokesmen express the fear that the recent de-
cisions will cripple collective bargaining:
[U]nder Jewel Tea, an agreement with a single employer as well
as a group of employers which has an effect on competition may
be held to violate the Sherman Act if the subject matter of the
agreement is found not to be related to wages, hours and working
conditions. Obviously, a hostile finder of fact could have con-
cluded in Jewel Tea that there was no necessary relationship be-
tween hours of work and hours of sale of meat. In that situation,
the Court apparently would have sustained a treble-damages
award against the Union.6
Professor Summers expresses the same belief:
63 See §303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 158 (1947),
as amended, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §187 (1964).64 Local 290, IBT v. I. E. Schilling Co., 340 F. 2d 286 (5th Cir. 1965), certiorari
denied-U.S.-, 15 L.Ed. 2d 464 (1966).
65 UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
66Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
67 Timbers, The Problems of Union Power a)td Antitrust Legislation, 16 Lab.
L. J. 545, 558 (1965).
68 Feller and Anker, supra note 41 at 107.
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Although the union in [in Jewel Tea] escaped liability, collec-
tive agreements were made captives of the anti-trust laws. Even a
simple agreement between a union and an employer loses its im-
munity if it regulates matters not "intimately related to wages,
hours and working conditions." Although the location of the
line is left in doubt, it is generally the same line as that separating
mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of bargaining. Thus,
any agreement on a non-mandatory subject may lose its claim to
immunity, and if then found to be an unreasonable restraint on
competition, will constitute a violation of the anti-trust laws.69
What is most interesting about these cases is not, paradoxically, the
changes (if any) wrought upon substantive doctrine, but the attitudes
displayed therein towards the threshold question of the continuing pro-
priety of imposing antitrust sanctions upon unions.
The Pennington litigation started out as a suit by the trustees of the
Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement Fund for contributions alleg-
edly due from the defendant-employer under a series of collective bar-
gaining agreements. In its answer and in a cross-claim against the union,
the defendant asserted that the union and certain coal mine operators
had conspired to restrain trade by, among other things, agreeing upon
wage scales and rates of welfare fund contributions that were calculated
to exceed what the operators of nonmechanized mines could afford to
pay. As described by Mr. Justice White:
The agreed solution was to be the elimination of the smaller
companies, the larger companies thereby controlling the market.
More specifically, the union abandoned its efforts to control the
working time of the miners, agreed not to oppose the rapid mech-
anization of the mines which would substantially reduce mine
employment, agreed to help finance such mechanization and
agreed to impose the terms of the 1950 agreement on all operators
without regard to their ability to pay. The benefit to the union
was to be increased wages as productivity increased with mechan-
ization, these increases to be demanded of the smaller companies
whether mechanized or not. Royalty payments into the welfare
fund were to be increased also, and the union was to have effec-
tive control over the fund's use. The union and large companies
agreed upon other steps to exclude the marketing, production,
and sale of nonunion coal. Thus the companies agreed not to
lease coal lands to nonunion operators, and in 1958 agreed not to
sell or buy coal from such companies."0
A trial before a jury resulted in the assessment of treble damages in the
employer's favor against the union and the trustees. The trial court set
aside the verdict against the trustees, but overruled the union's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed.
69Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 Yale L. J. 59, 78
(1965).
7o UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660 (1965).
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In reversing, the Supreme Court was unanimous in the result but
divided three ways in approach. Mr. Justice White wrote the opinion of
the Court, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan. One
separate opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr.
Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark; another was written by Mr. Jus-
tice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart.
The White opinion first considered the union's argument that the
trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The question presented was
whether, in the circumstances of the case, the union was exempt from
liability for violation of the antitrust laws. The question deserved short
shrift and was accorded it: the facts having clearly presented a com-
bination between a union and "non-labor groups," the rule of the Hut-
cheson and Allen-Bradley cases required rejection of the union's con-
tention. 71
Having said this much, the Court might profitably have turned to the
other issues involved in the case. However, apparently in response to an
argument by the union's attorney that the present situation differed
from Allen-Bradley in that the collective agreement at bar concerned
itself only with wages and did not presume to regulate prices,7 2 the Court
speculated at some length on the question of whether the traditional ap-
plication of antitrust laws to combinations of unions and employers may
properly impose liability where the agreement concerns wages rather
than the pricing of products. All that Mr. Justice White was doing was
inquiring whether the Hutcheson, Allen-Bradley rule might be further
qualified so as to broaden the scope of the "labor exemption" from the
antitrust laws; but in the course of his opinion, unfortunate dicta were
set loose which might well be-and have been7 3 -read in a contrary way.
The touchstone of legality, as Mr. Justice White sees it, is whether
the agreement is by its terms coextensive with the bargaining unit repre-
sented by the union, or whether it imposes upon the union a duty to ob-
tain from employers outside the unit, the same conditions of employ-
ment as provided in the agreement. Thus:
It is true that wages lie at the very heart of those subjects
about which employers and unions must bargain and the law
contemplates agreements on wages not only between individual
employers and a union but agreements between the union and
employers in a multi-employer bargaining unit.... We think it
beyond question that a union may conclude a wage agreement
with the multi-employer bargaining unit without violating the
antitrust laws and that it may as a matter of its own policy, and
not by agreement with all or part of the employers of that unit,
seek the same wages from other employers.7 4
71Id. at 662.
72Brief of counsel, UMW v. Pennington, 14 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1965).
73 See text accompanying nn. 68-69.
74 UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965).
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Having gone this far, Mr. Justice White at first blush seems to reverse
his field in an obiter dictum.
This [the passage just quoted] is not to say that an agreement
resulting from union-employer negotiations is automatically
exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotia-
tions involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of
the subject or the form and content of the agreement. Unques-
tionably the Board's demarcation of the bounds of the duty to
bargain has great relevance to any consideration of the sweep of
labor's antitrust immunity, for we are concerned here with har-
monizing the Sherman Act with the national policy expressed in
the National Labor Relations Act.... But there are limits to what
a union or an employer may offer or extract in the name of
wages, and because they must bargain does not mean that the
agreement reached may disregard other laws.75
The "limits," apparently, describe the point at which it may be reason-
ably inferred that the union's wage demands are made (1) for the cal-
culated purpose of placing the employer at a competitive disadvantage
and (2) for the benefit of and with the connivance of the employer's
competitors. Thus:
Unilaterally, and without agreement with any employer group
to do so, a union may adopt a uniform wage policy and seek vig-
orously to implement it even though it may suspect that some em-
ployers cannot effectively compete if they are required to pay the
wage scale demanded by the union. The union need not gear
its wage demands to those which the weakest units in the indus-
try can afford to pay. Such union conduct is not alone sufficient
evidence to maintain a union-employer conspiracy charge under
the Sherman Act. There must be additional direct or indirect
evidence of the conspiracy. 6
Mr. Justice White then reviews some ancient NLRB doctrine which
holds it an unfair labor practice for an employer to condition his execu-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement upon the union's procuring
similar terms from his competitors, and seems to conclude that the anti-
trust laws are in some way concerned with the preservation of unions'
rights to agree upon different terms with different employers.77
Having thus disposed of the union's argument concerning the "labor
exemption" from the antitrust laws, the Court reversed the judgment
below because the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that joint
efforts by the union and employers to influence the Secretary of Labor
75 Id. at 664-665.
76 Id. at 665 n. 2.
77 From the view of antitrust policy, moreover, all such agreements between a
group of employers and a union that the union will seek specified labor
standards outside the bargaining unit suffer from a more basic defect, with-
out regard to predatory intention or effect in the particular case. The salient
characteristic of such agreements is that the union surrenders its freedom




and the TVA to serve as unwitting allies in their conspiracy to drive
small operators out of business would constitute evidence of a violation
of the Sherman Act.
In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Douglas characterizes the
White opinion as an instruction to the trial judge that an "industry-wide
agreement" pursuant to which employers and a union agree on a wage
scale that exceeds the financial ability of some employers, if made for
the purpose of forcing those employers out of business, should be held
"prima facie evidence of a violation."7 3 Under this approach, antitrust
liability might be imposed upon a union for the execution, in a multi-
employer bargaining unit, of a contract whose terms exceeded the fi-
nancial abilities of certain members of the employer group, even though
the union was unaware of that fact and the acquiescence of the
majority of the employer group (thus binding the dissidents) to the
wage scale was predicated less on their desire to improve the lot of their
own employees than upon an intention to drive some of their fellows
out of business. In a footnote aside, Mr. Justice Douglas indicates that
he would apply the doctrine of conscious parallelism-under which an
unlawful conspiracy may be inferred from the fact of acceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate
in a plan the necessary consequence of which is a restraint of trade-
in antitrust suits involving unions, an approach which would seem
wholly at variance with that formulated in the White opinion.
Unlike Pennington, Jewel Tea posed the simple question of whether
an agreement between an employer and a union that was "imposed after
arm's length bargaining.., and was fashioned exclusviely" by the union
to serve its own interests, but which regulated the employer's marketing
hours, could be held violative of the Sherman Act.7 9 The grant of cer-
7s Id. at 673.
79Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). It seems plain from the Court's opinion that the
agreement was designed for the primary purpose of enabling retail butchers
to compete with supermarkets. The plaintiff, a supermarket chain, had intro-
duced in the Chicago area the practice of selling packaged meats in its
stores. The meat-cutting and packaging, one gathers, was performed during
their regular working hours by butchers who were members of the defendant
unions. Small butcher shops apparently found it uneconomical to stay open
after 6:00 p.m. evenings because their sales level, presumably, did not justify
the overtime rates that would have to be paid to their employees. Super-
markets, which customarily stayed open for business several hours after
the normal closing of small butcher shops, would have been accorded an
enormous competitive advantage if, during those hours, they were able to
sell, upon a self-service basis, packaged meats which had been earlier cut,
packaged, and arranged on shelves by their butchers during their regular
working hours. If this advantage had been accorded to the supermarkets,
the effect upon small butcher shops might well have been disastrous. It was
to the unions' interest-although perhaps not to the interest of their members
employed by the supermarkets-to encourage the survival of small butcher
shops, for any decrease in their number would of necessity decrease the
number of butchers' jobs in the unions' geographical jurisdiction.
After trial, the district court ruled that the "record was devoid of any
19661
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tiorari fragmented this question into two issues: whether the contractual
limitation upon the plaintiff's marketing hours was within the labor
exemption of the Sherman Act; and whether a claimed violation of the
Sherman Act which falls within the regulatory scope of the National
Labor Relations Act is subject to the exclusive primary jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board.80
With respect to the first issue, Mr. Justice White"' took pains to
note the limited scope of review presented under the grant of certiorari:
It is well at the outset to emphasize that this case comes to us
stripped of any claim of a union-employer conspiracy against
Jewel. The trial court found no evidence to sustain Jewel's con-
spiracy claim and this finding was not disturbed by the Court of
Appeals. We therefore have a situation where the unions, having
obtained a marketing-hours agreement from one group of em-
ployers, have successfully sought the same terms from a single
employer, Jewel, not as a result of a bargain between the unions
and some employers directed against other employers, but pursu-
ant to what the unions deemed to be in their own labor union
interests.8
If the Hutcheson dictum and the rule that may be synthesized from
the companion Allen-Bradley and Hunt v. Crumboch83 cases were to
evidence to support a finding of a conspiracy" between an association of small
butcher shops and the unions to force the restrictive provision on the plain-
tiff. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 129, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen, 215 F. Supp. 839, 845 (N.D. Ill. 1963). The court of appeals, in
reversing the dismissal of the complaint, did not disturb this finding. In effect,
the court of appeals held that the mere making of a collective agreement
which sought to regulate the employer's marketing hours was in and of it-
self violative of the Sherman Act, although its opinion (Jewel Tea Co. v.
Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, 331 F. 2d 547, 551 [7th Cir.
1964]) seems to flirt with the application of something like the conscious
parallelism test.
As it stood before the Supreme Court, the case was devoid of any question
concerning the existence of an actual conspiracy between the defendant
unions and non-labor groups to impose the marketing hours limitation upon
the plaintiff; and the Court, therefore, quite properly viewed the issue as the
narrow one of the legality of such a provision viewed solely in the context
of collective bargaining between one employer and one union. If nothing else,
Jewel Tea is a fascinating example of the permutation of a litigant's sub-
stantive rights that proceed from the doctrinal flipflops that commonly occur
as major litigation is pursued through various appellate procedures. If the
court of appeals had reversed the district court's findings on the question of
actual conspiracy, the logic of the White opinion in Pennington would have
doubtless compelled a different result in Jewel Tea.
80Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 379 U.S. 813 (1964).
81 In Jewel Tea, as in Pennington, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan
joined in the White opinion. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Clark joined, concurred in Pennington, but dissented
in Je'wel Tea. Mr. Justice Goldberg, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr.
Justice Stewart joined, dissented from the opinion but concurred in the re-
versal of Pennington, and concurred in the judgment, but seemingly dis-
sented from the opinion, in Jewel Tea.8 2 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688 (1956).
83 325 U.S. 821 (1945). See note 36 supra.
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have been literally applied, this statement of the issue would seem to
permit only one answer: the acts shown do not constitute a violation
of the Sherman Act. But since an agreement solely among businessmen
pursuant to which marketing hours are regulated might properly be held
a violation of the antitrust laws,8 Mr. Justice White concludes that the
true issue is not whether the facts show a substantive violation of the
Sherman Act, but whether "the agreement is immune from attack by
reason of the labor exemption from the antitrust laws.""5 The labor
exemption derives from section 20 of the Clayton Act, which speaks in
terms of the "lawfulness" of the particular union conduct under scru-
tiny;5" and so inquiry is focussed upon the question of the lawfulness
of the conduct at bar. Since the antitrust laws furnish but slight help as
to what union conduct is "lawful" and what is not, Mr. Justice White
accepts the gambit offered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Hutcheson,
and concludes, as he intimated was proper in Pennington, that lawful-
ness must be determined by considering "the subject matter of the
agreement in the light of the national labor policy."
'8 7
Having gone this far, Mr. Justice White flirts with the possibility
that the "lawfulness" of a union's demands and, hence of a collective
bargaining agreement, may be determined by considering whether the
84 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 693 n. 6 (1965).
85 Id. at 689.
86 The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organi-
zations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legiti-
mate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Section 6 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17
(1964). (Emphasis added.)
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court
of the United States . . . [which] shall prohibit any person or persons,
whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of em-
ployment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from
recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so
to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or
persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or
communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any per-
son to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize
or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, ad-
vising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do;
or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged
in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value;
or from peacefully assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful
purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be
done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall
any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States.
Section 20 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. §52
(1964). (Emphasis added.)
87 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965).
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particular issue at bar may properly be held to be a "mandatory" subject
of collective bargaining under section 8(d) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,88 but never quite decides the issue in precisely that way. The
question, then, is one of analogy: does the disputed item in the agree-
ment at bar seem more akin to mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing than to trade regulation, or do the scales tip the other way? As Mr.
Justice White puts it:
[T]he issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restric-
tion, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to
wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful
attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arms-length
bargaining in pursuit of their own labori union policies, and not
at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls
within the protection of the national labor policy and is therefore
exempt from the Sherman Act.89.
The White opinion goes on from this point to explain why the
marketing-hours restriction resembles wages, hours, and working condi-
tions and is therefore within the labor exemption. The fuzziness of
the distinction made between mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing and those subjects which are so "intimately related to wages, hours
and working conditions" as to warrant invocation of the labor exemp-
tion has troubled a variety of commentators ;90 but the distinction was
dictated by the way in which the Court answers the first question posed
ss [T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession....
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1965).
89 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965).
90 See text accompanying nn. 68-69. Professor Handler is apparently of the
opinion that no meaningful distinction was intended by Mr. Justice White.
Does Justice White accord an antitrust exemption to all mandatory
subjects of bargaining which are reduced to agreement? Or does he,
as Justice Goldberg states, draw lines among mandatory subjects based
upon their importance to the union? Justice White's principal inquiry
in Jewel Tea was directed toward whether the marketing hours limita-
tion was "intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions"
and was of "immediate and direct" concern to the union's members.
Would he say that there are subjects about which labor and manage-
ment must bargain which are not of immediate and direct concern to
the union and intimately related to wages, hours and working condi-
tions? Or is he using the two concepts as verbal variants, so that there
is no substantive difference between matters of such union concern
and mandatory subjects of bargaining? Would Justice White hold
that a union and employer must bargain, but that if they agree, they
have no labor exemption and may violate the Sherman Act? It is dif-
ficult to believe that any such bizarre result was intended. A more
plausible interpretation of his opinion is this: agreements on all manda-
tory subjects are exempt; and the test of whether an agreement falls
within this exempted category is whether the subject is intimately re-
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in the grant of certiorari, whether the subject matter of the case
falls within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board.
Somewhat obscurely, the White opinion describes the issue in the
following terms:
On this point, which is distinct from the unions' argument that
the operating hours restriction is subject to regulation only by
the Board and is thus wholly exempt from the antitrust laws,
the unions' thesis is that the pivotal issue is whether the operat-
ing hours restriction is a "term or condition of employment"
and that the District Court should have held the case on its docket
pending a Board proceeding to resolve that issue, which is said
to be peculiarly within the competence of the Board.91
In the discussion of the issue as thus framed, the opinion completely
ignores the question of whether exclusive jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the litigation was intended by Congress to fall within the reg-
ulatory scheme of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947-both
NLRB proceedings and court litigation under §303-and treats
solely of the question of primary jurisdiction to determine whether
the marketing hours regulation really involves a "term or condition of
employment." Since "courts are themselves not without experience in
classifying bargaining subjects as terms or conditions of employment, 92
and the "doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not a doctrine of futility
... [which would] require resort to 'an expensive and merely delaying
administrative proceeding when the case must eventually be decided on
a controlling legal issue wholly unrelated to determinations for the as-
certainment of which the proceeding was sent to the agency'," 93 Mr.
Justice White sees no reason why the Board, rather than the district
court, should make the determination. This is particularly so because
"the Board does not classify bargaining subjects in the abstract but
only in connection with unfair labor practice charges of refusal to bar-
gain" ;94 and Jewel Tea, having actually come to terms with the unions,
could not have filed a charge upon which the Board would have acted.95
Moreover, the opinion notes, Jewel Tea had filed no charge with the
lated to the traditional union objectives and is of direct and immediate
concern to the union.
Handler, Eighteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 20 Record
of N.Y.C.B.A. 540, 546 (1965).
91Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684 (1965).92 1d. at 686.
9 Ibid.
941d. at 687.95 Actually, it is not uncommon for the Board to issue a complaint founded
upon charges of refusual to bargain filed by a party to a signed collective
bargaining agreement. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734 (1963). It is fundamental that a party to a collective agreement may
obtain relief from compliance with an unlawful provision thereof upon a
properly filed §8(a) (5) charge. Old Town Shoe Co. and United Shoe Workers
of America, 91 N.L.R.B. 240 (1950).
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Board; and the six-month limitation period would thus prevent the liti-
gation of its claim. A further consideration is the fact that the issuance
of complaints is a matter for the discretion of the Board's General
Counsel, and so, "even in the few instances when the antitrust action
could be framed as a refusal to bargain charge, there is no guarantee of
Board action." 96
In his separate opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg expresses sharp criti-
cism of both White opinions. These opinions "represent refusals by
judges to give full effect to congressional action designed to prohibit ju-
dicial intervention via the anti-trust route in legitimate collective bar-
gaining" 97 and "constitute a throwback to past days when courts allowed
antitrust actions against unions and employers engaged in conventional
collective bargaining, because 'a judge considered' the union or employer
conduct in question to be 'economically and socially' objectionable." ' s
A thumbnail review of the major antitrust decisions in the light of legis-
lation enacted specifically to regulate the conduct of labor-management
relations impels the conclusion that there is "a consistent congressional
purpose to limit severely judicial intervention in collective bargaining
under cover of the wide umbrella of the antitrust laws, and rather, to
deal with what Congress deemed to be specific abuses on the part of la-
bor unions by specific proscriptions in the labor statutes" 99 and that,
accordingly, "the Court should hold that, in order to effectuate congres-
sional intent, collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining under the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust
laws."1 00
The basic trouble with Pennington, according to Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, is that:
Since free collective bargaining inevitably involves and requires
discussion of the impact of the wage agreement reached with a
particular employer or group of employers upon competing em-
ployers, the effect of the Court's decision will be to bar a basic
element of collective bargaining from the conference room.' 01
9 0Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 687 (1965).
97 Id. at 697.
9sId. at 700.
99 Id. at 709. In a footnote (Id. at 708 n. 9) Mr. Justice Goldberg observed:
As this case does not involve an Allen-Bradley situation, it is not
necessary to determine whether Congress, in enacting these Taft-
Hartley boycott and related revisions to the Labor Act and at the
same time rejecting an attempted codification of the Allen-Bradley
doctrine in the antitrust laws, intended that all union activities in
this area be covered solely under the comprehensive regulation of
the labor statutes with their restricted injunctive and damage pro-
visions.
Mr. Justice Goldberg to the contrary notwithstanding, it does seem quite
patent that the Court's opinion in Pennington assumes that an Allen-Bradley
situation was presented. See text to accompany notes 70-73, supra.1l Id. at 710.
101 Id. at 714.
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It is to be presumed that well advised employers and unions will take
pains, in the future, to avoid the making of express agreements pursu-
ant to which the unions undertake to exact from other employers identi-
cal terms with those agreed to by the contracting employer ;102 and this
means that, "under settled antitrust principles ... the existence of such
an agreement, express or implied, may be inferred from the conduct of
the parties."13 The making of such an inference, Mr. Justice Goldberg
goes on to say, would depend upon a determination that "hourly wage
rates and fringe benefits were set at a level designed to eliminate the
competition of the smaller nonunion companies by making the labor
cost too high for them to pay."' ' 0 4 The White opinion thus constitutes an
"approval of judges and juries determining the permissible wage scale
for working men in an industry,"'05 although the history of congres-
sional action makes it "clear that Congress intended to foreclose judges
and juries from making essentially economic judgments in antitrust ac-
tions by determining whether unions or employers had good or bad
motives for their agreements on subjects of mandatory bargaining."' 0 6
The Goldberg criticism of the White opinion in Pennington proceeds
upon the assumption that unions have a legitimate interest in the main-
tenance of uniform wage levels and that it is therefore mandatory, un-
der the labor laws, for employers and unions to bargain with reference
to conditions among employers not covered by the affected (single-em-
ployer or multi-employer) bargaining unit. Since it is agreed that the
doctrine of the NLRB's primary jurisdiction has no application in anti-
trust litigation, 0 7 the crux of the opinions' difference would seem to be
nothing more than differing views as to the proper ambit of the scope
of mandatory bargaining.
This difference is also at the heart of their disagreement in Jewel
Tea. Although the White opinion was careful to skirt making a deter-
102 Cf. Feller and Anker, supra note 41 at 107-08:
What can unions do, in the light of these decisions, to protect them-
selves against antitrust suits? The first rule, of course, which is pre-
scribed by Pennington is to make no agreements with any employers
as to what kind of agreements, even as to wages, hours or working
conditions, the union will negotiate with other employers. Beyond,
that, it is important, if a union has a policy of seeking uniform agree-
ments across an industry, to make it clear in every possible way that
this is a union policy developed without consultation with employers,
so as to negate any inference of a forbidden agreement. It would be
helpful, for example, to express such a policy in formal convention or
executive board resolutions which explain the reasons for the policy, and
which stress the workers' interest in uniform terms and conditions of
employment.
103 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 715 (1965).
20 4 Id. at 718. The reference to "nonunion" companies seems to have been a slip
of the pen.
105 Ibid.
106 Id. at 719.
1o Id. at 710 n. 18.
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mination that the marketing-hours limitation constituted a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining,10 s the Goldberg opinion imputes to it
the making of such a determination and then chastises it for not holding
that agreement upon such an issue necessarily precludes antitrust lia-
bility. Thus:
My Brother White recognizes that the issue of the hours of sale
of meat concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining based on
the trial court's findings that it directly affected the hours of
work of the butchers in the self-service markets, and therefore,
since there was a finding that the Union was not abetting an in-
dependent employer conspiracy, he joins in reversing the Court
of Appeals. In doing so, however, he apparently draws lines
among mandatory subjects of bargaining, presumably based on a
judicial determination of their importance to the worker, and
states that not all agreements resulting from collective bargain-
ing based on mandatory subjects of bargaining are immune from
the antitrust laws, even absent evidence of union abetment of an
independent conspiracy of employers. Following this reasoning,
my Brother White indicates that he would sustain a judgment
here, even absent evidence of union abetment of an independent
conspiracy of employers, if the trial court had found 'that self-
service markets could actually operate without butchers, at least
for a few hours after 6 p.m., that no encroachment on butchers'
work would result and that the workload of butchers during nor-
mal working hours would not be substantially increased. .. .'
... Such a view seems to me to be unsupportable. It represents
a narrow, confining view of what labor unions have a legitimate
interest in preserving and thus bargaining about.10 9
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas argued that there was no "imme-
diate and direct" connection between marketing hours and working
hours,"0 and that, presumably, the question of marketing hours could
in no way be classified a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
The case thus presented a clear instance of the Allen-Bradley rule, and
the dissent would affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
V.
The most curious thing about the Pennington and Jewel Tea deci-
sions is that the Court's three-way split is predicated upon unanimous
assent to one basic proposition: the power of the judiciary to regulate,
under the antitrust laws, matters which also fall within the regulatory
scheme of the labor laws."' Although the three opinions differ sharply
108 See text to accompany notes 87-95, supra.
109 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher lWorkmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 727 (1965).
110 Id. at 737-738.
111In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, (1966) the
doctrine-see, e.g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959)-that conduct arguably protected by §7 of the National Labor
Relations Act or arguably prohibited by §8 of the Act, except for acts or
threats of violence, falls within the preemptive jurisdiction of the National
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in their characterization of the conduct involved in each case, they all
seem in agreement upon two issues: if the defendants' agreement were
indeed upon a mandatory subject of bargaining and there were no in-
dependent evidence of such agreement being in aid of a conspiracy
among non-labor groups, liability could not attach under the antitrust
laws; and it is for the court, when faced with a claimed violation of
the antitrust laws, to determine whether the agreement at bar really
did involve an issue upon which employers and unions are required to
bargain.
There are certain mandatory subjects of collective bargaining which
have, over the years, been so clearly identified that it is hard to imagine
judges arguing over whether they are, indeed, mandatory. Among these
issues are, pre-eminently, wages, hours of work, pensions, and the like.
Other issues-and the marketing hours limitation in Jewel Tea is a per-
fect example of these-seem to partake, at first blush, both of an en-
croachment upon the businessman's capacity to exercise ordinary busi-
ness judgment and of an analogue to "wages, hours and terms of em-
ployment." Although Mr. Justice White was able to point to numerous
instances in which agreements among busineessmen to limit marketing
hours were held violative of the antitrust laws, it is significant that in
none of the three opinions was there any reference to authority under
the National Labor Relations Act for the proposition that it is or is not
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the
representative of his employees concerning the hours during which the
employer will be open for business, if the employer's marketing hours
and the hours of work of a certain class of his employees represented
by the particular union do not necessarily coincide. Thus one is pre-
sented with the anomalous situation of the White opinion refusing to
decide whether the issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining; the Gold-
berg opinion asserting that it plainly is a mandatory subject and claim-
ing the White opinion agrees therewith; and the Douglas opinion clearly
indicating that the subject has nothing whatever to do with the scope of
mandatory bargaining.
There is clearly presented here a sharp conflict between the policies
of the antitrust laws and of the national labor laws-but not only a sub-
stantive conflict. What is more significant is that the congressional
intention of leaving to the courts the determination of what arrange-
ments should be held violative of the antitrust laws, while spelling out
in detail what forms of conduct are violative of the national labor pol-
icy, has been frustrated. If we are to take seriously the idea that the
National Labor Relations Board is endowed with some peculiar exper-
Labor Relations Board received another setback. Here, the question was
whether the doctrine of preemption would bar the maintenance of an action




tise that suits it better for the determination of what forms of activity
are to be encouraged and what to be discouraged within the broad exer-
cise of jurisdiction under which it operates, it would seem that only the
Board should have the power to determine, in the first instance, whether
a particular subject really does fall within the scope of mandatory bar-
gaining. The contrary rule, adopted unanimously by the Court, will
doubtless stifle collective bargaining by tending to fix for all time as
"mandatory" issues what a court at one time may believe is or is not
such an issue; and the declared public policy in favor of the peaceful
resolution of labor disputes cannot but be impeded by such a view.
112
112 The Court . . . bleeds some of the vitality from Fibreboard, for
unions and employers may now be reluctant to bargain concerning
non-mandatory subjects and thus not develop many practices which will
permit growth in the scope of collective bargaining.
Summers, supra note 69, at 78 n. 82.
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